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Standing to Allege Violations of the
Doctrine of Specialty: An Examination of the
Relationship between the Individual
and the Sovereign
Mary-Rose Papandreat
In extradition treaties, sovereign powers promise to surren-
der individuals who have been accused or convicted of an offense
outside their territory to the country seeking to prosecute the
individual for that offense. Because entering into an extradition
treaty involves the sacrifice of some sovereign rights, these
treaties are always reciprocal: a state will relinquish its unfet-
tered right to grant asylum to whomever it pleases only if the
other parties to the treaty agree to do the same. In addition,
extradition treaties contain certain protections that limit the
sacrifices these sovereign powers must make. One such restric-
tion that is part of every extradition treaty is the doctrine of
specialty.'
The doctrine of specialty dictates that once the asylum state
extradites an individual to the requesting state under the terms
of an extradition treaty, that person can be prosecuted only for
the crimes specified in the extradition request.2 In United States
v Rauscher, the United States Supreme Court held that the
specialty doctrine applies to every extradition treaty to which the
United States is a signatory, even if specialty is not explicitly
mentioned.3 Rauscher indicates that an individual extradited to
t BA 1992, Yale University; J.D. 1995, The University of Chicago.
1 See United States v Rauscher, 119 US 407 (1886).
If the individual comes under the court's jurisdiction outside the scope of the
extradition treaty, the defendant cannot claim any of the protections that the treaty might
afford. See United States v Alvarez-Machain, 112 S Ct 2188, 2192 (1992); Ker v Illinois,
119 US 436, 443 (1886).
3 119 US 407, 422-24, 430 (1886). Although the courts of other countries have also
enforced the doctrine of specialty, this Comment only addresses under what circumstances
an individual extradited to the United States should have standing to allege a violation of
the doctrine. Almost all cases involving the doctrine of specialty in United States courts
concern individuals surrendered to the United States. See Note, International Extradition,
the Principle of Specialty, and Effective Treaty Enforcement, 76 Minn L Rev 1017, 1018-19
n 15 (1992). In a very small number of cases, defendants surrendered by the United
States to another country will attempt to assert the doctrine; however, any holding by a
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the United States has standing to assert the doctrine when the
surrendering state also clearly objects to the additional charges
not mentioned in the extradition request.4 What remains unclear
after Rauscher is under what circumstances an individual has
standing to allege a violation of the doctrine when her asylum
country does not explicitly object to the additional charge. As a
result, courts and commentators continue to debate the scope of
standing to allege a violation of the doctrine of specialty.
Different theories of international relations point toward
several possible solutions to this issue, and some of these ap-
proaches are reflected in current case law. Some courts have
granted standing to individuals only when the surrendering state
registers an implicit or explicit protest. This position draws on
the most traditional theory of international law-political real-
ism-which considers only the relationship between the sovereign
states that are signatories to the extradition treaty.5 Under this
approach, individuals do not have standing to assert violations of
international law because international law applies exclusively to
states.6 The cosmopolitan theory of international relations, on
the other hand, would always allow the individual to have
standing to assert the doctrine. Cosmopolitan theory posits that
international society is most appropriately characterized as a
society of individuals, and thus international law should focus on
individuals, not states.' With respect to extradition treaties,
United States court on this issue can only be "advisory in character." See Shapiro v
Ferrandina, 478 F2d 894, 906 (2d Cir 1973). The extradited individual may assert a viola-
tion only in the courts of the country requesting extradition because United States courts
have no power to create rights binding in the courts of another country. See Berenguer v
Vance, 473 F Supp 1195, 1198 (D DC 1979). Once a defendant is extradited from the
United States, she must rely on the intervention of the executive branch to ensure that
the doctrine of specialty is followed. See Note, 76 Minn L Rev at 1018-19 n 15.
' When a defendant has standing to assert the doctrine, she essentially has the
power to oppose the requesting state's claim to personal jurisdiction over her. See United
States v Vreeken, 803 F2d 1085, 1088 (10th Cir 1986) ("Insofar as a defendant has a right
to claim the doctrine's protection, it functions to limit the court's personal jurisdiction over
the defendant.").
' Realism dominated international theory from Thucydides to Machiavelli to
Morgenthau. Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, "At the Bar of World Politics: The Supreme
Court and International Law (unpublished manuscript on file with U Chi L Rev). Promi-
nent realists include Hans Morgenthau, Georg Schwarzenberger, E.H. Carr, George
Kennan, Reinhold Niebuhr, Arnold Wolfers, and Robert Strausz-Hup6. See Anne-Marie
Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda,
87 Am J Intl L 205, 207 & n 5 (1993).
s P.E. Corbett, Law and Society in the Relations of States 53 (Harcourt, Brace, 1951).
7 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics 84--86
(Columbia, 1977).
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cosmopolitan theory assumes that such treaties function to
protect individuals against their sovereigns and therefore that
individuals are subjects of international law. Some courts have
taken an approach that at first glance seems to fall in the middle
of these two extreme positions. They allow individuals to assert
the doctrine unless the surrendering state explicitly waives it. In
fact, however, this "middle position" is just a moderated version
of political realism because it emphasizes the will of the sover-
eigns involved. This approach operates on a presumption that an
asylum state's silence is tantamount to an objection.
This Comment argues that in United States courts individu-
als should have standing to allege violations of the doctrine of
specialty only when the surrendering state does not guarantee
minimum due process to individuals within its control. This
approach rests on liberal international relations theory, also
known as liberalism.' Liberalism posits that the central concern
in the international law context is the relationship between
states and the individuals they represent.9 As long as the state
adheres to certain minimum standards when dealing with indi-
viduals in its domestic affairs, it can be regarded as adequately
protecting the interests of those individuals in the international
sphere. When this is the case, the United States should respect
that state's decision concerning the invocation of the specialty
doctrine. However, if the state fails to adequately represent the
interests of individuals within its control-whether actually
citizens" or merely persons within the territory of that
state-extradited defendants should be permitted to assert the
doctrine of specialty in United States courts.
' Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, Richard Cobden, Woodrow Wilson, Norman
Angell, Joseph Schumpeter, and John Maynard Keynes are all noted critics of political
realism who have contributed to the development of liberal international relations theory
by emphasizing the effects of social equality and political representation on world politics.
See Andrew Moravcsik, Liberalism and International Relations Theory 1 (Center for
International Affairs, Harvard University, 1993) (Working Paper Series no 92-6) (on file
with U Chi L Rev).
Id at 3.
'o The United States and other common law countries are generally willing to extra-
dite their own nationals. However, the United States has not always been able to convince
other states to agree to do the same. As a result, some United States treaties either do
not provide for the extradition of nationals or explicitly forbid it. See Michael Abbell and
Bruno Ristau, 4 International Judicial Assistance: Criminal Extradition § 13-2-4(6) at 67-
71 (International Law Institute, 1990) (outlining the different sorts of provisions concern-
ing nationals in U.S. treaties). Recently, however, the United States has concluded three
new treaties providing for the extradition of nationals. These treaties replaced old ones
that did not so provide. See id § 13-1-3(3) at 15.
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Part I of this Comment outlines the historical background
and political underpinnings of extradition treaties generally and
the doctrine of specialty in particular. Part HI outlines some
possible approaches to the issue of standing to assert violations
of the doctrine of specialty, and their theoretical underpinnings.
Part III introduces liberalism and reveals its connection to other
doctrines that limit the scope of extradition treaties. This Com-
ment proposes that liberalism can contribute to the development
of a coherent theory for the specialty doctrine. As a proxy for
determining whether a given state can be trusted to represent
the rights of individuals in the international sphere, United
States courts should consider whether the surrendering state
would provide an adequate alternative forum in the civil litiga-
tion context. When the surrendering state would not provide an
adequate alternative forum, the individual should have the right
to allege a violation of the doctrine of specialty.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EXTRADITION
A. History of Extradition
Under international criminal law, states have a duty to ex-
tradite only individuals accused of a select few international
crimes, including war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes
against humanity. In the absence of an extradition treaty, a
sovereign nation enjoys the unrestricted right to grant asylum to
whomever it pleases.' The United States Supreme Court recog-
nized this basic tenet of sovereignty in Factor v Laubenheimer,
holding that although a state may have a moral duty to extradite
a fugitive from justice, there is no legal duty to do so unless the
state enters into an extradition treaty so providing.3
The United States signed its first extradition treaty with the
United Kingdom in 1794, one of almost one hundred new extradi-
tion treaties concluded during the eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries. 4 Today, extradition treaties are the most com-
" Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 315 & n 97 (Oxford, 4th ed
1990).
12 Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts, eds, Oppenheim's International Law
950 (Longman, 9th ed 1992). See also Rauscher, 119 US at 412 (stating that according to
principles of international law, states are not obligated to surrender fugitives to the state
in which their crimes were committed).
13 290 US 276, 287 (1933). See also United States v Alvarez-Machain, 112 S Ct 2188,
2194 (1992).
14 Geoff Gilbert, Aspects of Extradition Law 10-11 (Kluwer Academic, 1991).
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mon tool for extracting fugitives from other countries.15 Howev-
er, states may still surrender individuals to other countries with
which they do not have an extradition treaty or for offenses not
listed in such a treaty solely out of comity." In addition, states
have occasionally extracted an individual from another country
by force. Although nations usually respect the territorial integrity
of other nations, the United States itself has circumvented at
least one extradition treaty by abducting an accused fugitive
from another country without that country's consent. 7
Both the purposes and processes of extradition treaties have
evolved considerably in the last two centuries." Before the eigh-
teenth century, extradition agreements were usually incidental to
"treaties of peace and alliance," and often their primary purpose
was to guarantee the surrender of political fugitives to their
sovereigns.'9 Today, however, political offenses are no longer
extraditable." In response to the increasing ease and speed with
which criminals can seek asylum in another country, extradition
agreements during the last two hundred years have come to
encompass a growing range of ordinary crimes.2' Additionally,
although offenses included in these treaties were once strictly
See id at 8.
'6 See, for example, Fiocconi v Attorney General of United States, 462 F2d 475, 477
(2d Cir 1972). Even in the absence of an extradition treaty, there are a variety of reasons
why a country might surrender an individual seeking asylum. For example, a nation
might decide for policy reasons to turn over to a wartime ally a traitorous political offend-
er who gave aid and comfort to the nations' common enemy. See Chandler v United
States, 171 F2d 921, 935 (1st Cir 1948) (using this scenario as an example). United States
law does not permit the executive to grant extradition requests at its discretion: there
must be an extradition treaty in place between the United States and the requesting
state, or domestic legislation, for the executive to grant such a request. Valentine v
Neidecker, 299 US 5, 9 (1936). For example, in 1990 the United States Congress enacted a
law that permits the Secretary of State to surrender a United States citizen to another
country even if a treaty does not so require. See International Narcotics Control Act of
1990 § 11(a), Pub L No 101-623, 104 Stat 3350, 3356 (1990), codified at 18 USC § 3196
(Supp 1990).
" See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S Ct at 2197, where the United States Supreme Court
held that the abduction of a Mexican national from Mexico to stand trial in the United
States did not violate the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico.
8 There is some evidence of extradition treaties before the eighteenth century. It is
generally agreed that the first treaty providing for extradition procedures was between
Rameses H of Egypt and the Hittite prince Hattushilish III after Rameses defeated the
Hittites in war in 1250 B.C. See Gilbert, Aspects of Extradition Law at 9 (cited in note
14); Ivan A. Shearer, Extradition in International Law 5 (Manchester, 1971).
19 See Shearer, Extradition in International Law at 6; Gerhard von Glahn, Law
Among Nations: An Introduction to Public International Law 286 (Macmillan, 6th ed
1992).
'o Id.
2 Id; Gilbert, Aspects of Extradition Law at 1 (cited in note 14).
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construed, nations will now often agree to extradite individuals
for lesser included offenses.2 Lastly, although extradition was
historically a political matter settled by heads of state, by the
nineteenth century most states, including the U.S., had involved
their judiciaries in the decision whether to comply with extradi-
tion requests.23
Although states are not obligated to enter into extradition
treaties, there are many reasons why they might do so. Some
commentators argue that parties to extradition agreements are
most concerned with suppressing crimes that both the surrender-
ing and extraditing countries recognize, in order to preserve
world public order.24 One English court wrote that:
[t]he law of extradition is... founded upon the broad princi-
ple that it is to the interest of civilized communities that
crimes, acknowledged to be such, should not go unpunished,
and it is part of the comity of nations that one state should
afford to another every assistance towards bringing persons
guilty of such crimes to justice."
States have a mutual interest in preventing criminals from using
territorial boundaries as a shield against their just punish-
ments." The legal order of each state depends upon the actual
enforcement of its criminal processes. As such, states are willing
to cooperate in order to preserve peace within their own borders.
Other commentators have focused on states' more selfish
motivations for entering into extradition treaties. Some suggest
that states agree to surrender accused individuals in part be-
cause they are anxious to get rid of foreign criminals.27 A state
Jennings and Watts, eds, Oppenheim's International Law at 962 (cited in note 12).
See Michael P. Shea, Expanding Judicial Scrutiny of Human Rights in Extradition
Cases After Soering, 17 Yale J Intl L 85, 88-90 (1992). Two states that retain exclusive
executive control over extradition decisions include Spain and Ecuador. Id at 88 n 11. In
the United States, when a foreign state makes an extradition request a judge reviews the
case and makes a recommendation to the Secretary of State, who in her discretion may
then issue a warrant for the individual's surrender. See 1 Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 478 at 582 (1987) ("Restatement of Foreign
Relations"); 18 USC § 3184 (1988 & Supp 1993).
24 See, for example, Glahn, Law Among Nations at 284 (cited in note 19); M. Cherif
Bassiouni, 1 International Extradition: United States Law and Practice 7 (Oceana, 2d ed
1987). See also M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition: A Summary of the Contem-
porary American Practice and a Proposed Formula, 15 Wayne L Rev 733, 733, 760-61
(1969) (arguing that nations should adopt a less parochial, more international view of
criminality).
In re Arton, 1 QB 108, 111 (1896).
26 Glahn, Law Among Nations at 284 (cited in note 19).
G7 -eorg Schwarzenberger, The Problem of an International Criminal Law, in George
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might also find that in order to prosecute individuals effectively,
it makes practical sense to enter into extradition treaties with
bordering countries or with countries that would refuse to extra-
dite fugitives without a treaty guaranteeing reciprocal treat-
ment." Extradition treaties have become a particularly impor-
tant tool for enforcing laws against crimes of an international na-
ture, such as organized crime, narcotics trafficking, money laun-
dering, and terrorism.29 States might also use extradition trea-
ties to solidify close commercial or political ties with each other.
In other words, independent sovereign nations may use extradi-
tion treaties to create a "mutuality of obligations" that benefits
their sovereign interests.3 Currently the United States is a par-
ty to over one hundred extradition treaties."'
Although political concerns have remained the primary moti-
vation for extradition treaties, in recent times nations have be-
come more concerned about the treatment of extradited individu-
als. In an effort to protect human rights, nations have negotiated
for more procedural requirements to ensure that extradited indi-
viduals are prosecuted only for offenses considered criminal by
the surrendering state or within the scope of the extradition trea-
ty.32 The doctrine of specialty is one of the most important of
Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger, eds, 3 Current Legal Problems 263, 272 (Stevens &
Sons, 1950); Edward M. Wise, Some Problems of Extradition, 15 Wayne L Rev 709, 710-11
(1969) (discussing the hypothesis that states enter into extradition treaties in order to rid
themselves of foreign criminals, but then rejecting this argument).
Wise, 15 Wayne L Rev at 711.
Richard A. Martin, Address Before the Fordham University School of Law (Feb 28,
1991), in Problems in International Law Enforcement, 14 Fordham J Intl L 519, 519
(1990-91). Generally, nations have been quite successful fighting all of these crimes except
terrorism, which typically results from internal unrest within a country and thus poses a
possible threat to the sovereignty of a nation. Id at 520, 524. States that do not wish to
appear as "instruments of a more powerful country, like the United States," have often
refused to cooperate with other nations to develop a coherent world policy against ter-
rorism. Id at 525.
" Bassiouni, 15 Wayne L Rev at 735 (cited in note 24).
" See 18 USC § 3181 (1988 & Supp 1993) (listing extradition treaties to which the
United States is a party). The texts of these treaties are reproduced in Igor I. Kavass and
Adolf Sprudzs, eds, Extradition Laws and Treaties: United States (Hein, 1980 & Supp
1987). However, the United States lacks effective extradition treaties with a number of
countries. See, for example, United States Department of State, Treaties in Force 147,
207, 224 (1994) (Korea, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia).
' Shearer, Extradition in International Law at 13-16 (cited in note 18). For example,
two important protections are the double criminality doctrine-which essentially guaran-
tees that the fugitive could be prosecuted for the same crime in her asylum state had the
crime been committed there-and the political offense doctrine discussed in text accompa-
nying notes 75-81. See Gilbert, Aspects of Extradition Law at 52-53 (cited in note 14) (dis-
cussing double criminality).
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these procedural protections.
B. The Development of the Doctrine of Specialty
The United States Supreme Court first recognized the doc-
trine of specialty in United States v Rauscher. In that case, the
United States asked Great Britain to extradite William
Rauscher, an officer on an American vessel at the time of his
alleged crimes, to stand trial on a charge of murder on the high
seas. Great Britain agreed. Once Rauscher arrived in the United
States, however, he was also charged with infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment-a charge not included in the extradition
request.3
The United States's request for the extradition of Rauscher
was made pursuant to an extradition treaty between the United
States and Great Britain. Although this treaty enumerated cer-
tain offenses for which an individual could be extradited, it did
not explicitly stipulate that an extradited individual could only
be charged with the crimes indicated in the extradition request.
However, the Supreme Court held that the specific enumeration
of extraditable offenses made it clear that the countries could not
charge an individual with any other offenses:
It is unreasonable that the country of the asylum should be
expected to deliver up such person to be dealt with by the
demanding government without any limitation, implied or
otherwise, upon its prosecution of the party.'
The Court's announcement that this "limitation," later called the
doctrine of specialty, was implicit in the United States-United
Kingdom extradition treaty was hardly a magnanimous gesture
to the British. The United States had a pragmatic reason to
abide by the doctrine of specialty: if it followed the doctrine, it
would be more likely that nations seeking extradition of persons
from the United States would prosecute them only within rea-
sonable limits. In fact, since Rauscher, all United States extradi-
tion treaties have explicitly included the doctrine of specialty,
thus eliminating the need for courts to read the doctrine into treaties M
The Rauscher Court was unclear as to whether a defendant
has standing to assert a violation of the doctrine of specialty, or
Rauscher, 119 US at 409.
Id at 419.
See Abbell and Ristau, 4 International Judicial Assistance: Criminal Extradition §
13-2-4 at 76-77 (cited in note 10).
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whether that right lies solely with the surrendering state. Ac-
cording to the Court, the doctrine of specialty is a right accorded
to defendants pursuant to formal extradition proceedings. The
Court held that treaties may "contain provisions which confer
certain rights upon the citizens. . . which are capable of enforce-
ment as between private parties in the courts of the country."36
Treaty provisions that concern individual rights are judicially en-
forceable because under the United States Constitution, treaties
are "the supreme Law of the Land":37 their provisions must be
treated just as the provisions of any statute." However, even
though the Rauscher Court referred to the doctrine as the
defendant's "right," it did not determine whether this right is
independently enforceable absent support from the surrendering
country, from which the defendant's treaty rights are derived. 9
At a minimum, the facts of Rauscher indicate that when the
asylum country registers a formal, or even implicit, protest to
additional charges, the individual has standing to raise this ob-
jection. Although in Rauscher the defendant himself asserted the
doctrine, he did so with the implicit support of Great Britain, his
asylum country. In a previous case involving a fugitive named
Winslow, Great Britain had refused to grant the United States's
extradition request without a "preliminary pledge" from the Unit-
ed States government that it would not prosecute him for any
crimes other than forgery, the offense for which extradition was
demanded." Given the recent and extensive diplomatic negotia-
tions concerning the application of the doctrine of specialty to
this extradition treaty in the case of Winslow, it was reasonable
for the Court to assume that Great Britain would have objected
to the additional charges made against Rauscher.4 Still,
Rauscher left open the issue of whether an individual should
have standing when her asylum state does not formally or implic-
itly allege a violation of the doctrine.
Rauscher, 119 US at 418, quoting the Head Money Cases, 112 US 580, 598 (1884).
, US Const, Art VI, cl 2.
3 Rauscher, 119 US at 419.
Even courts that believe defendants should be given broad standing rights concede
that any rights defendants obtain from treaties are derivative in nature. See, for example,
Leighnor v Turner, 884 F2d 385, 389 (8th Cir 1989).
4o Rauscher, 119 US at 415.
41 See Ford v United States, 273 US 593, 615 (1926) (Rauscher "was decided at the
end of a prolonged controversy between Great Britain and the United States through
their State Departments"); United States v Kaufman, 858 F2d 994, 1008-09 (5th Cir 1988)
(noting same).
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IL CURRENT APPROACHES TO THE ISSUE OF STANDING TO
ALLEGE VIOLATIONS OF THE SPECIALTY DOCTRINE
Some courts hold that only the surrendering state can object
to violations of the doctrine of specialty: the individual lacks the
power to raise the issue on her own. Others have contended that
individuals can assert the doctrine as long as the surrendering
state does not expressly waive its right to object to the charges. A
third possible approach suggests that individuals should always
have the right to assert the doctrine, even if the surrendering
state expressly consents to its violation. The conflict among these
approaches fundamentally rests on a theoretical disagreement
about the position of individuals in international law.
A. Political Realism: Only the Asylum State Can Assert a
Specialty Violation
Some circuit courts have decided that the defendant has
standing to assert the doctrine of specialty only if the surrender-
ing state itself objects in some way.4' This approach to the doc-
trine of specialty rests on the theory of international relations
called political realism.
Realists believe that the goal of international law is to main-
tain peace and stability between nations.43 The realist theory is
often conceptualized as the "billiard ball model" of international
relations because it views states as formally and functionally
identical and opaque with regard to their domestic and state-
society relations." Individuals play no role in this model, and
accordingly, they can derive very few rights from treaties. Unless
a treaty explicitly provides individuals with enforcement rights,
such rights do not exist.
45
42 The Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have taken this position.
See United States v DiTommaso, 817 F2d 201, 212 (2d Cir 1987); Shapiro v Ferrandina,
478 F2d 894, 905 (2d Cir 1973); United States v Kaufman, 874 F2d 242, 243 (5th Cir
1989); United States v Munoz-Solarte, 1994 US App LEXIS 18128, *3 (7th Cir). The Sixth
Circuit also has indicated that it would follow a restrictive approach to standing. See
Demjanjuk v Petrovsky, 776 F2d 571, 583-84 (6th Cir 1985) (citing Shapiro and stating
that "there is a serious question. whether [the defendant] has standing to assert the
principle of specialty").
' Fernando R. Tes6n, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 Colum L Rev 53,
72-74 (1992).
Arnold Wolfers first used the phrase "billiard ball model" to describe realist politi-
cal theory. See Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Poli-
tics 19-24 (Johns Hopkins, 1962).
' See Note, 76 Minn L Rev at 1021 (cited in note 3).
Doctrine of Specialty
Realists argue that because sovereign states have no duty to
surrender individuals to another state in the absence of an extra-
dition treaty, but rather have an absolute right to grant asylum,
the doctrine of specialty is needed "to protect the extraditing
government against abuse of its discretionary act of extradi-
tion."" When a state enters into an extradition treaty, it sacri-
fices a limited portion of its right to grant asylum to the accused
individual.47 Under the realist view, the doctrine of specialty
functions to protect the remaining sovereign rights of the asylum
state, which continue to immunize the defendant from prosecu-
tion for those acts not covered by the extradition request. When
an asylum state waives the doctrine of specialty, it effectively
denies the extradited individual asylum for any additional
crimes. Because a sovereign state reserves the right to grant or
deny asylum, the individual is at the state's mercy. An extradi-
tion treaty does not give a defendant a greater right to demand
asylum than she would have had without an extradition trea-
ty.48
Although there is no consensus on exactly what motivates
sovereign parties to enter into extradition agreements, realists
contend that states enter into extradition agreements only to
serve their own interests, and not the interests of accused indi-
viduals. One court has noted that:
[a]s a matter of international law, the principle of specialty
has been viewed as a privilege of the asylum state, designed
to protect its dignity and interests, rather than a right ac-
cruing to the accused.49
According to this view, treaties function simply as contracts be-
tween sovereign states designed to further the interests of each
signatory. Parties perform their contractual duties because they
have faith that the other party will reciprocate. Because specialty
41 United States v Paroutian, 299 F2d 486, 490 (2d Cir 1962).
41 See Jaffe v Smith, 825 F2d 304, 306 (11th Cir 1987). See also Rauscher, 119 US at
411-12 ("Prior to these treaties, and apart from them.., there was no well-defined obliga-
tion on one country to deliver up such fugitives to another, and though such delivery was
often made, it was upon the principle of comity, and within the discretion of the govern-
ment whose action was invoked; and it has never been recognized as among those obliga-
tions of one government towards another which rest upon established principles of inter-
national law.").
' See Ker v Illinois, 119 US 436, 442 (1886). In Ker, the Supreme Court rejected the
defendant's contention that an extradition treaty creates a right not to be taken from the
asylum state outside the terms of the treaty. Id at 441-42.
"' Shapiro, 478 F2d at 906.
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is intended to serve the interests of the asylum state, the benefits
the doctrine confers on individual defendants are purely second-
ary and incidental. 0 Under this contract analogy, extradited
individuals are essentially third-party beneficiaries *of extradition
treaties: their rights are derived exclusively from the rights of
the surrendering sovereign. Thus, when the surrendering nation
fails to assert the doctrine, it waives not only its own rights but
the derivative rights of the individual as well. For realists, the
doctrine of specialty is a right created by the state that can be
denied by the state: it is by no means a fundamental right em-
bedded in natural law.
At a minimum, the most stringent realist approach to the
doctrine of specialty-denying an individual standing unless the
asylum state expressly objects-is inconsistent with Rauscher.
Although the Rauscher Court did not openly discuss the issue of
standing, it granted the defendant standing to assert a specialty
violation even though his asylum country only implicitly objected.
Therefore, to be consistent with Rauscher, realists must at least
concede standing to defendants when the surrendering state
implicitly or explicitly alleges a specialty violation.
But even if realists were to make this concession it would not
be enough. Construing treaties as mere contracts oversimplifies
them.5' In R auscher, the Court repeatedly referred to the doc-
trine of specialty as a right of both the extraditing nation and the
extradited defendant. 2 Although the defendant's specialty rights
clearly derive from those of the asylum state, the language of the
Rauscher decision indicates that a defendant is more than just a
third-party beneficiary to the treaty: the individual's rights are at
the heart of the specialty doctrine. Thus, to concentrate solely on
the rights of the asylum state misconstrues the doctrine's essen-
tial nature. A comprehensive theory of the specialty doctrine
must take into account the rights of both the surrendering state
and the extradited individual.
o Id.
51 Indeed, many of the fundamental tenets of contract law do not apply in the case of
treaties. For example, a state often cannot escape its treaty violations by claiming it was
coerced to enter into the treaty. This makes sense because many treaties, especially peace
treaties,are the product of direct, or at least indirect, coercion. Thomas M. Franck and
Michael J. Glennon, Foreign Relations and National Security Law 243 (West, 1987). Con-
sideration also plays no important role in treaty formation. Id. Furthermore, a state
cannot claim that an internal law prevents it from fulfilling its treaty obligations, except
under very limited circumstances. Id.
52 119 US at 419, 422.
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B. Moderated Political Realism: Defendants Have Standing
absent Express Waiver of Specialty by the Asylum State
The Third, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits apply
an explicit waiver approach.53 Under this approach, courts in-
quire whether the surrendering state could have asserted a spe-
cialty violation and allow defendants to make those same objec-
tions unless the surrendering state explicitly waives the doctrine.
Although this approach appears to consider both individual and
state rights, it is also grounded in political realism.
Like those who argue that the surrendering state must ex-
plicitly or implicitly object, those who support this approach ar-
gue that the extraditee's standing to assert the doctrine is only
derivative: the extraditee may object only to breaches to which
the surrendering country would have been entitled to object.'
Advocates of this approach believe that the protections afforded
by the specialty doctrine "exist ... only to the extent that the
surrendering country wishes.""5 Thus, like the restrictive ap-
proach outlined in Section II.A., political realism provides the
theoretical basis for this slightly more moderate position because
of the exclusive focus on the asylum state's interests.
The only difference between this approach and the stricter
realist position presented above is that under this moderated
approach, the surrendering nation need not make any express or
implicit objection before the extraditee can raise the doctrine of
specialty as a defense; it is sufficient that the surrendering na-
tion might have raised the same objections.56 This position as-
sumes that silence on the part of the surrendering state essen-
tially amounts to an objection, and thus allows the extradited
' See United States v Riviere, 924 F2d 1289, 1301 (3d Cir 1991); Leighnor v Turner,
884 F2d 385, 389 (8th Cir 1989); United States v Thirion, 813 F2d 146, 151 & n 5 (8th Cir
1987); United States v Cuevas, 847 F2d 1417, 1426 (9th Cir 1988); United States v Najohn,
785 F2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir 1986); United States v Diwan, 864 F2d 715, 721 (11th Cir
1989); United States v Herbage, 850 F2d 1463, 1466 n 7 (11th Cir 1988); United States v
Sensi, 879 F2d 888, 895 (DC Cir 1989). See also Comment, Standing for the Doctrine of
Specialty in Extradition Treaties: A More Liberal Exposition of Private Rights, 25 Loyola
LA L Rev 1377, 1386 (1992); Note, 76 Minn L Rev 1017 (cited in note 3); Note, Individual
Rights and the Doctrine of Speciality: The Deterioration of United States v. Rauscher, 14
Fordham Intl L J 987, 1002 & n 79 (1990).
Leighnor, 884 F2d at 389; Najohn, 785 F2d at 1422.
Najohn, 785 F2d at 1422, citing Shapiro v Ferrandina, 478 F2d 894, 906 (2d Cir
1973).
Najohn, 785 F2d at 1422.
One commentator argues that in Rauscher the Supreme Cotirt assumed that Great
Britain's silence meant that it objected to the additional charges against Rauscher. See
Note, 76 Minn L Rev at 1031 (cited in note 3).
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defendant to assert the doctrine when the state is silent in order
to protect the state's interests. However, once the surrendering
state expressly consents to the additional charges, the defendant
loses standing to assert the doctrine. The inquiry under this
moderate approach focuses on the surrendering state just as the
inquiry under strict political realism does. In both cases, the
defendant's rights are limited to and defined by the interests of
the surrendering state.
Supporters of the moderate approach argue that political
factors and the desire for efficient treaty enforcement support the
defendant's right to standing. A state may decide not to protest
because it faces political pressure to ignore the situation.58 An
individual would then be able to assert the doctrine without her
asylum nation sacrificing its national interests. Advocates for this
position also make the practical argument that, because it is
difficult for a foreign state to keep track of proceedings after it
has extradited an individual, it is more efficient to let the indi-
vidual assert the doctrine.59
Because this approach is grounded in realism, it has the
same fundamental flaws as the stricter realist approach dis-
cussed in Section II.A. In addition, this approach has its own
unique problems. First, just as states are sometimes under pres-
sure not to raise a specialty objection, they can also be pressured
to waive the doctrine entirely; if this is the case, this moderated
realist approach would accord the individual defendant no re-
course. Second, by allowing an individual to hold up a prosecu-
tion whenever the extraditing government is officially silent re-
garding the additional charges, this approach may allow defen-
dants to assert the doctrine even in cases where two governments
agree for perfectly legitimate reasons that the requesting state
should conduct a prosecution for offenses whether or not they are
named in the formal extradition request. To require formal con-
sent whenever the extraditing country wishes to press additional
charges would place a heavy administrative burden on both par-
ties. Because nations commonly expand the scope of their agree-
ments, a requirement of formal consent in every case would often
run counter to the mutual interests of the countries involved. In
' See id at 1038 n 96 (arguing that "[blecause the only practical remedies for the
surrendering state are to lodge a diplomatic protest or to deny the next extradition re-
quest, either of which may create or heighten political tension between the countries, it is
unlikely to protest the more routine treaty violations").
9 Id at 1039.
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its attempt to correct some of the flaws in the strict realist ap-
proach, this moderated approach creates new problems of its
own.
C. Cosmopolitan Theory: Defendants Have an Unequivocal Right
to Standing
The cosmopolitan theory of international law suggests that
individuals should always have the right to assert the doctrine of
specialty, even if the asylum country expressly waives its rights
under an extradition treaty. Rather than conceptualizing interna-
tional law as a conflict between sovereign states, cosmopolitans
view individuals as subjects of international law who can derive
rights directly from it.6° Accordingly, an individual need only
show that she was the intended beneficiary of the extradition
treaty in order to have standing to assert a violation of the trea-
ty.6 No matter what the surrendering sovereign says or does,
the terms of the treaty cannot be waived.
The cosmopolitan approach draws on the finding in Rauscher
that extradition treaties are self-executing: they do not require
the aid of instituting legislation to become effective." It also
finds support in one of the primary purposes of the doctrine of
specialty, to secure some protections for an extradited individual.
Cosmopolitans give individuals complete control over the exercise
of this right because fundamentally they distrust the state's abili-
ty to make an appropriate judgment between individual rights
and state authority.
Although the cosmopolitan approach may at first appear
attractive, it has a number of significant problems. First, this
approach confuses the question of whether a treaty is self-execut-
ing with the question of whether a party has standing to enforce
its terms.63 For example, a treaty could include the doctrine of
' See Glahn, Law Among Nations at 235-49 (cited in note 19) (discussing the emer-
gence of the individual as a subject of international law in the human rights context);
Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, International Law and Asylum as a Human Right 13-15 (Public
Affairs, 1956) (discussing individuals as subjects of international law under natural law
theory).
6 See Warth v Seldin, 422 US 490, 500 (1975) ("Essentially, the standing question
[depends on] whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests
properly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judi-
cial relief.").
62 See Rauscher, 119 US at 418-19.
1 Restatement of Foreign Relations § 111 comment h (cited in note 23) ("Whether a
treaty is self-executing is a question distinct from whether the treaty creates private
rights or remedies."). See also Cook v United States, 288 US 102, 121-22 (1933); Head
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speciality but explicitly provide that individuals cannot assert it
without the consent of their asylum state. The provision provid-
ing for the doctrine of speciality would be self-executing but the
extradited individual would have no right to assert it on her own.
Ordinarily, claims for violation of an international obligation may
be made only by the state to whom the obligation is owed.'
States recognize that individuals have rights in the first instance,
but individuals are deemed to have delegated the protection of
these rights to their governments vis-&-vis other governments, as
long as their governments protect their rights at home.
Second, the cosmopolitan approach fails to recognize that the
doctrine of specialty does not just serve to protect the individual;
it is first and foremost part of the bargain states have made to
protect their sovereign interests.65 Even when an extradition
treaty is in place, sovereign powers retain discretionary power to
surrender fugitives to one another under circumstances not out-
lined in the relevant treaty." Individuals do not have a right to
asylum; rather, the grant of asylum and immunity lies solely in
the providence of the sovereign state."7 Therefore, it would un-
dermine the relationship between sovereign states to permit
defendants to allege violations of specialty even when their asy-
lum state explicitly waives it. The defendant should not have
standing unless there are special circumstances in her asylum
state that lead the federal court to believe that its failure to
assert the specialty doctrine is somehow illegitimate.
Ill. APPLYING LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY TO
THE ISSUE OF STANDING
This Part introduces liberalism as a theory of international
law and illustrates its influence in several other areas of United
States extradition law. This Comment then argues that courts
Money Cases, 112 US 580, 598-99 (1884).
' 2 Restatement of Foreign Relations § 902 comment a (cited in note 23). See also id
§ 906 comment a.
' See Gilbert, Aspects of Extradition Law at 107 (cited in note 14) (stating that the
cosmopolitan approach "may be a sensible progression" but that "it does seem to go
against the spirit of the principle of specialty which is to treat it as part of the bargain
between states, as well").
" See Glahn, Law Among Nations at 313-14 (cited in note 19); United States v
Alvarez-Machain, 112 S Ct 2188 (1992).
See Glahn, Law Among Nations at 303-13 (cited in note 19) (discussing circum-
stances in which governments have historically chosen to grant asylum); Note, The
Principle of Specialty: A Bifurcated Analysis of the Rights of the Accused, 29 Colum J
Transnatl L 407, 412 (1991) (rejecting the claim that individuals have a right to asylum).
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should grant defendants standing to allege specialty violations
only when the surrendering state cannot be considered an ade-
quate representative of individual interests in the international
sphere. In order to make this determination, United States
courts should inquire whether the surrendering state would con-
stitute an adequate alternative forum-that is, whether the sur-
rendering state in its domestic affairs adequately guarantees
minimum due process rights. Such an inquiry can serve as a
proxy determination of the nation's ability to protect individual
rights in the international sphere. The goal of this approach is to
reach an appropriate balance between the rights of the surren-
dering state and the rights of the extradited individual.
A. Liberal International Relations Theory
Liberal international relations theory offers a conceptual
middle ground between realists and cosmopolitan theorists. Lib-
eralism posits that international relations are driven by a concep-
tually prior set of relationships between the individuals and
groups in domestic society and the state itself.6 Liberals see
states as formed as the result of a social contract-in which indi-
viduals recognize the value of establishing an autonomous state
authority that is then entitled to exercise power over them so
long as their fundamental rights are preserved. This contract is
the guarantee of social order; the state must thereafter establish
a balance between the need to protect the individual and the
need to preserve that order. Liberalism recognizes that the state
is still the primary actor in international relations, but maintains
that in order for international law to function properly in the
protection of human rights, the state must be a trustworthy rep-
resentative of the interests of its individuals.69 Ideally, each
state serves as an agent in the international realm in order to
protect the individual.
According to liberal theory, when states conclude extradition
treaties they are in effect agreeing to assist each other as long as
each can be sure that the other will in fact protect the rights of
the individuals within its control." The United States courts,
See Moravcsik, Liberalism and International Relations Theory at 3 (cited in note 8)
"'Society' should be understood as 'an aggregate of autonomous individuals and voluntary
groups with pre-political interests... separate from and prior to the nation-state.'" Id at
11. The interests of individuals are represented through political institutions and social
practices bridging the gap between society and state. Id.
' See Slaughter Burley, 87 Am J Intl L at 227 (cited in note 5).
'0 See Glucksman v Henkel, 221 US 508, 512 (1911) ("We are bound by the existence
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then, should respect a state's decision to assert treaty violations
if the foreign government can be trusted to protect the rights and
interests of the individuals within its control.
Whether a foreign government adequately represents
individuals' interests in its dealings with other states is a diffi-
cult inquiry. However, determining whether the state adheres to
certain minimum standards in the treatment of individuals in its
domestic affairs is an appropriate proxy. If the state guarantees
minimum human rights in domestic affairs, then it can be re-
garded as a valid representative of these individuals in interna-
tional affairs. When this is the case, United States courts should
respect the state's decision whether to allege treaty violations.
However, liberal theory recognizes that asylum countries will not
always protect the human rights of requested individuals, partic-
ularly when the relationship between a state and its individuals
has changed since the extradition treaty was signed. It is gener-
ally assumed that the United States does not enter into extradi-
tion treaties with countries that do not respect human rights."
However, not all governments are stable. Occasionally, the do-
mestic situation in a once trustworthy country changes so dra-
matically that it no longer protects fundamental rights as it once
did, 2 even though the extradition treaty is technically still in
effect.7 When the relationship between a state and its individu-
als becomes unsatisfactory, defendants should have standing to
assert violations of international law even if their asylum country
expressly waives its right to do so. Although "liberal states" may
be broadly defined as "states with juridical equality, constitution-
of an extradition treaty to assume that the trial will be fair.").
71 See, for example, Ahmad v Wigen, 726 F Supp 389, 411 (E D NY 1989). This
assumption has merit. There is evidence that the United States has in the past refused to
enter into international human rights treaties because they did not offer as much protec-
tion as its domestic law. See Dean Rusk, A Personal Reflection on International Covenants
on Human Rights, 9 Hofstra L Rev 515, 520 (1981). See also Additional Views, Extradi-
tion Act of 1984, HR Rep No 998, 98th Cong, 2d Sess 61 n 19 (1984) (citing Senate's
refusal to consent to extradition treaty with the Philippines based on human rights con-
cerns).
2 See, for example, Ker v Illinois, 119 US 436 (1886). Ker involved an extradition
treaty between the United States and Peru. A United States agent went to Peru with an
extradition warrant for Ker that he intended to present to local authorities. However,
when he arrived in Lima, he found that the city was in political chaos-it had been taken
over by the military forces of Chile. The agent then decided to bypass the formal extradi-
tion procedures completely and simply abducted Ker and brought him back to the United
States for prosecution. See Charles Fairman, Ker v. Illinois Revisited, 47 Am J Intl L 678
(1953) (providing historical facts not provided in the Ker opinion itself).
71 See Bassiouni, 1 International Extradition at 41 (cited in note 24) (stating that "a
change in government does not abrogate a treaty").
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al protections of individual rights, representative republican gov-
ernments, and market economies based on private property
rights," 4 other forms of government that do not meet these cri-
teria may also be deemed to protect the interests of their citizens
under certain circumstances.
B. Current Extradition Practices Reflect the Principles of
Liberalism
Liberalism is not an abstract legal theory with little rele-
vance to current law. In fact, liberal theory provides a coherent
explanation of several current extradition practices. The political
offense exception and the frequency with which courts inquire
into the domestic affairs of other nations during extradition hear-
ings provide two such examples. These practices illustrate that
United States courts routinely investigate the relationship be-
tween other nations and individuals under their control before
they will respect an agreement made between sovereign powers.
This sort of inquiry is the essence of the liberal approach.
1. The political offense doctrine.
Although the first extradition treaties were primarily intend-
ed to secure the return of fugitives who had committed political
crimes against their sovereigns, today political crimes are no
longer extraditable. Under the political offense doctrine, par-
ties to extradition treaties may refuse extradition requests when
the asylum nation regards the alleged offense as one of political
character. Although the United States does not have a statute
formalizing this exception to extradition, modern extradition
treaties to which the United States is a party commonly provide
for this exception explicitly.76
For the purposes of extradition, a political offense is often
defined as "an offense committed in the course of and incidental
to a violent political disturbance, such as war, revolution, and
rebellion."77 However, the offense must not only be incidental to
" Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the
Act of State Doctrine, 92 Colum L Rev 1907, 1909 (1992).
7 See Glahn, Law Among Nations at 286 (cited in note 19).
7 See, for example, Escobedo v United States, 623 F2d 1098, 1104 (5th Cir 1980)
(discussing the United States-Mexico extradition treaty).
" Id. See also Ornelas v Ruiz, 161 US 502, 511-12 (1896); In re Extradition of Gonza-
lez, 217 F Supp 717, 720-21 (S D NY 1963); Eain v Wilkes, 641 F2d 504, 514 (7th Cir
1981).
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or form a part of a political disturbance, but also be in further-
ance of one side or another in a bona fide struggle for political
power. 8 Courts have labeled the following offenses as nonextra-
ditable political offenses: hijacking a plane to obtain freedom;
assassination or attempted assassination of important public
figures; planting bombs to gain attention or support for a political
cause; and robbery committed to obtain funds for a political
movement.79 For example, in United States v Doherty, a United
States magistrate refused to grant the United Kingdom's request
for the extradition of a member of the Provisional Irish Republi-
can Army who fled from charges that he killed a British sol-
dier.8" The extradition magistrate held that this was a political,
offense and thus not extraditable under the treaty between the
United States and Great Britain.81
The primary purpose of the political offense doctrine is to
protect the due process rights of the individual. Asylum states do
not want to extradite an individual when it is likely that the
prosecution in the requesting country will be unfair. United
States courts are willing to exercise this doctrine even though to
do so may at times place them in a politically uncomfortable
position. The political offense exception thus reflects liberal theo-
ry because it is essentially concerned not with the relationship
between the states involved in the international sphere, but with
the domestic relationship between individuals and the state.
When there is reason to believe that the state cannot be trusted
to protect the rights of individuals, the political offense doctrine
demands that United States courts refuse extradition requests.
2. Erosion of the noninquiry rule.
Under the tradition rule of noninquiry, courts determining
whether a defendant is extraditable may not examine the politi-
cal or judicial system of the requesting state. 2 However, many
courts and commentators have recognized that serious substan-
tive or procedural due process concerns may occasionally necessi-
" See Escobedo, 623 F2d at 1104; Karadzole v Artukovic, 170 F Supp 383, 392 (S D
Cal 1959). This requirement that there be a nexus between the act and the uprising has
been interpreted liberally. See Quinn v Robinson, 783 F2d 776, 809-10 (9th Cir 1986).
' See 1 Restatement of Foreign Relations § 476 n 4 (cited in note 23).
8 786 F2d 491 (2d Cir 1986).
8 Id at 494.
For a defense of the traditional, strict noninquiry rule, see Jacques Semmelman,
Federal Courts, the Constitution, and the Rule of Non-Inquiry in International Extradition
Proceedings, 76 Cornell L Rev 1198 (1991).
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tate judicial review of the domestic affairs of other countries. 3
Like the political offense exception, such inquiries reflect
liberalism's emphasis on the primacy of the relationship between
the sovereign and the individual.
Some treaties contain provisions specifically authorizing
courts to refuse extradition requests when it is unlikely the de-
fendant would receive a fair trial in the tribunal of the request-
ing nation. For example, the treaty between the United States
and the United Kingdom provides that extradition is prohibited
"if the person sought establishes.., by a preponderance of the
evidence that.., he would, if surrendered, be prejudiced at his
trial or punished, detained, or restricted in his personal liberty
by reason of his race, religion, nationality, or political opin-
ions.'
The "noninquiry rule" originated in 1901 when the Supreme
Court in Neely v Henkel held that Americans prosecuted abroad
were not entitled to all the protections afforded by United States
procedural requirements.85 The Court held that the defendant
had no right to a trial "in any other mode than that allowed to its
own people by the country whose laws he has violated and from
whose justice he has fled."" Proponents of the noninquiry rule
argue that United States courts should not question the quality
of a nation's court system or the motives behind its decision to
extradite. 7 This position assumes that because the United
States entered into an extradition agreement with the requesting
country, that country will provide a fair trial.88 Strict interpret-
ers of the noninquiry rule argue that courts must trust the Secre-
tary of State to intervene to prevent the extradition if she be-
lieves it necessary to prevent an injustice.89
Current law indicates that the noninquiry rule is not as
absolute as it may have once been. Lower courts and commenta-
See 1 Restatement of Foreign Relations § 476 comment h (cited in note 23).
Supplemental Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom (June 25, 1985), US-
UK, Art 3, a, S Exec Rep 99-17, 99th Cong, 2d Sess 16 (1986).
180 US 109, 122-23 (1901). See also Glucksman v Henkel, 221 US 508, 512 (1911);
In re Extradition of Burt, 737 F2d 1477, 1485 & n 11 (1984).
180 US at 123.
In re Howard, 996 F2d 1320, 1329-30 (1st Cir 1993); United States v Martinez, 755
F Supp 1031, 1036-37 (N D Ga 1991).
' See, for example, Glucksman, 221 US at 512 ("We are bound by the existence of an
extradition treaty to assume that the trial will be fair.").
' See Ahmad v Wigen, 726 F Supp 389, 411 (E D NY 1989). See also In re Extradi-
tion of Tang Yee-Chun, 674 F Supp 1058, 1068 (S D NY 1987) (finding that it is the
function of the Secretary of State, not the courts, to determine whether extradition should
be avoided for humanitarian reasons).
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tors have suggested that exceptions to the noninquiry rule are
essential when the fundamental minimal due process rights of
the accused are in danger." In Gallina v Fraser, the Second Cir-
cuit stated that it could "imagine situations where [a defendant],
upon extradition, would be subject to procedures or punishments
so antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency as to require
reexamination of the [noninquiry rule]."9 Although a country
may have guaranteed minimum due process protections at the
time an extradition treaty was signed, it is possible that at the
time of its enforcement that country no longer offers such
protections. When this happens, it is important that courts take
an active role in protecting minimum human rights, rather than
leaving this role solely to the Secretary of State.92 The fear is
that the Secretary of State would sacrifice the rights of individu-
als in the name of foreign policy: "For obvious reasons of state,
our diplomats are rarely eager to label foreign governments un-
just, particularly when military and economic advantages hang
in the balance."93 Furthermore, not only are courts more willing
to make such highly political decisions about another state's good
faith or due process procedures, the potential embarrassment to
United States foreign policy is minimalized because of the rela-
tively insulated nature of judicial decisions.94
' See, for example, Ahmad, 726 F Supp at 412-20. See also Gill v Imundi, 747 F
Supp 1028, 1048-50 (S D NY 1990); Comment, The Tension between Policy Objectives and
Individual Rights: Rethinking Extradition and Extraterritorial Abduction Jurisprudence,
41 Buff L Rev 627, 631 (1991); John G. Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition
Law, 76 Georgetown L J 1441, 1492 (1988).
91 278 F2d 77, 79 (2d Cir 1960). See also Demjanjuk v Petrovsky, 776 F2d 571, 583
(6th Cir 1985), quoting Gallina, 278 F2d at 79 (holding that the court would not inquire
into the procedures of the extraditing nation unless they were found to be "antipathetic to
a federal court's sense of decency"); Sahagian v United States, 864 F2d 509, 514 (7th Cir
1988), quoting Burt, 737 F2d at 1487 (stating that inquiry into "particularly atrocious pro-
cedures or punishments employed by the foreign jurisdiction" may be necessary in excep-
tional cases).
' See Shea, 17 Yale J Intl L at 131-32 (cited in note 23). See also Kester, 76
Georgetown L J at 1481 (arguing that "the State Department cannot be trusted to weigh
the rights of individuals against the government's own international law enforcement and
foreign policy agenda"); Wise, 15 Wayne L Rev at 722-23 (cited in note 27) ("The question
of whether a fugitive will meet with oppressive treatment is [not] suitable for consider-
ation by executive departments, which are commonly influenced by a fear of offending
some fairly despicable regimes.").
" Extradition Reform Act of 1981, Hearings on HR 5227 before the Subcommittee on
Crime of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong, 2d Sess 60 (1982) (statement
of Professor Christopher H. Pyle).
' Congress explicitly recognized this unique power of the courts when it enacted the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub L No 94-583, 90 Stat 2891, codified at 28
USC §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-11 (1988). In that legislation, Congress
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The political offense doctrine and the exceptions courts have
made to the noninquiry rule suggest that United States courts
have already accepted the essential principle of liberalism in the
context of extradition treaties: it is necessary to insure that the
individual-sovereign relationship is intact before placing full faith
in the sovereign as a valid representative of those individuals in
the international sphere.
C. Applying Liberal Theory to the Doctrine of Specialty:
Guaranteeing Defendants' Due Process
Like the political offense exception and exceptions to the
noninquiry rule, the doctrine of specialty similarly functions to
protect both individual and sovereign rights. The doctrine allows
a signatory to an extradition treaty to escape the duties the trea-
ty imposes when a crucial assumption underlying the trea-
ty-that the other parties to the treaty can be trusted as legiti-
mate representatives of the individuals within its control as well
as protectors of due process rights-is no longer valid.
In most situations the interests of the sovereign and its indi-
viduals are not mutually exclusive. A state signs an extradition
treaty in order to secure the return of fugitives from its own
justice system, but it does not want to sacrifice its sovereign
power entirely. Sovereign power includes the ability to extend
asylum to fugitives from justice. Even when states limit this
power by entering into extradition treaties, they retain the power
to protect those individuals from indiscriminate prosecution in
the requesting state. In this regard, the doctrine of specialty
serves to guarantee that the essential contractual nature of the
extradition agreement is upheld. In particular, the doctrine guar-
antees that the asylum country has given up its sovereign right
to grant asylum only for the crimes mentioned in the initial ex-
tradition agreement and no others. Additionally, extradition trea-
ties protect individual rights by providing procedures by which a
requesting country can gain custody of a suspected criminal with-
out resorting to kidnapping, exclusion, or deportation, which are
more likely to ignore an individual's rights." The doctrine also
serves to protect extradited individuals from indiscriminate pros-
decided to vest decisions about foreign state immunity in the courts rather than the State
Department. See Thomas M. Franck, Political Questions, Judicial Answers: Does the Rule
of Law Apply to Foreign Affairs? 104-06 (Princeton, 1992) (discussing the congressional
history of this Act's passage).
" Gilbert, Aspects of Extradition Law at 4 (cited in note 14).
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ecution in the requesting country and to guarantee some sem-
blance of due process.
In determining whether a defendant should have an indepen-
dent right to allege specialty violations, courts must consider the
relationship between the surrendering country and the people
within its control. Courts often inquire into the democratic na-
ture of foreign governments to determine whether to respect their
internal domestic judgments.96 For example, in Bi v Union Car-
bide Chemicals & Plastics Co., Inc., the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the lower court's decision to defer to India's judg-
ment that disputes arising from the Bhopal accident in 1984
would best be resolved by granting the government of India itself
exclusive standing to represent the victims of the mass tort in
courts all around the world.9" The plaintiffs in the United States
court sought, damages from Union Carbide for the Bhopal acci-
dent and collaterally attacked the Indian government's settle-
ment of their claims.9" The Supreme Court of India had upheld
the Bhopal Act granting such broad powers of representation to
the Indian government and excused the government's failure to
give several thousand claimants notice of the settlement before
its approval.99
Although the Second Circuit ultimately affirmed the lower
court's decision to deny the plaintiffs standing, it did so only after
a thorough examination of the nature of the Indian govern-
ment.' Implicit in the court's decision was the conclusion that
the Bhopal Act was a valid law worthy of respect-even if it
would have been held unconstitutional under the United States
Constitution'0 k--because it was enacted by a democratic govern-
ment. The court emphasized that India is a democracy with a
constitution that "provides for a republican form of parliamentary
government and guarantees the fundamental rights of the people,
including equal protection and procedural due process."0 2 The
decision suggests that had India's government been less demo-
' 1 Restatement of Foreign Relations § 476 comment h (cited in note 23). Courts
have inquired into the domestic affairs of other nations in nonextradition contexts as well.
For example, courts frequently undertake such inquiries when reviewing decisions of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service concerning whether to grant political asylum in
the United States to persons fearing persecution.
984 F2d 582 (2d Cir 1993), cert denied, 114 S Ct 179 (1993).
9 Id at 585.
Id.
"9 Id at 585-86.
101 Id at 586.
'02 Id at 585.
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cratic, the court might not have approved India's method of deal-
ing with the aftermath of this industrial accident."°3
Like the Bi court, United States courts deciding whether to
grant standing to individuals asserting specialty violations
should inquire into the representative nature of the government
of the surrendering state. The doctrine of specialty is a procedur-
al right; although in many ways it functions to protect sovereign
interests, it also serves to guarantee extradited defendants due
process. In order to enforce this guarantee, United States courts
should inquire whether the surrendering state does in fact repre-
sent the interests of its people.
It would be impractical and inefficient for the courts to en-
gage in a full-scale inquiry into the political conditions in the
surrendering country in every case in which the extradited indi-
vidual attempts to invoke the doctrine of specialty. However, an
inquiry into whether the surrendering state provides adequate
procedural safeguards for individuals in its courts could serve as
an efficient proxy determination. This inquiry would be much like
the threshold inquiry in the application of the forum non conveni-
ens doctrine which simply asks whether the foreign court will
afford the parties due process. 4 In making a forum non conve-
niens determination, one of the factors courts consider is the na-
ture of the foreign state's government.0 5
Under the proxy test this Comment proposes, an individual
who has been extradited from a country experiencing severe
political turmoil or repression should have standing to assert the
doctrine of specialty if the court determines that this turmoil
prevented the surrendering state from adequately representing
the individual. Examples of similar inquiries in forum non conve-
niens "adequate alternative forum" determinations are numer-
ous."° In Walpex Trading Co. v Yacimientos Petroliferos, the
" See id at 586 ("[India] decided in an act passed by its democratic parliament to
represent exclusively all the victims in a suit against Union Carbide.") (emphasis added).
See also id ("We are deferring to the statute of a democratic country to resolve disputes
created by a disaster of mass proportions that occurred within that country.") (emphasis
added).
" See Gulf Oil Corp. v Gilbert, 330 US 501, 508 (1947).
"C5 See William L. Reynolds, The Proper Forum for a Suit: Transnational Forum Non
Conveniens and Counter-Suit Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 70 Tex L Rev 1663, 1667-
70 (1992).
'" A similar inquiry is made in the field of choice of law. In Zschernig v Miller, Jus-
tice Harlan wrote in his concurrence, "[]n the field of choice of law there is a nonstatutory
rule that the tort law of a foreign country will not be applied if that country is shown to
be 'uncivilized.'" 389 US 429, 461-62 (1968).
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court noted that civil and political chaos in Bolivia might make
Bolivia an inadequate forum.' Similarly, in Rasoulzadeh v As-
sociated Press, the court held that Iran was not an adequate
forum because if the plaintiffs returned to Iran to prosecute the
claim, they would probably be shot.'
An extradited individual should also have standing to assert
specialty if the court determines that the judicial system of the
surrendering country does not provide due process to individuals
in that country. An example of such an inquiry was present in
the Bhopal litigation, in which the court questioned whether the
foreign judicial system was reliable.0 9 Union Carbide contended
that Indian courts did not observe due process standards that
would be required as a matter of course in the United States. 10
Another example of a similar inquiry is noted in Phoenix Canada
Oil Co. Ltd. v Texaco, Inc., where the court found an alternative
forum inadequate because of its political climate. The court noted
that in order to be considered adequate, "the alternative forum
must ... provide comparable procedural protections to those in
the United States.""'
This threshold determination of due process is essential to
ensuring that the asylum state adequately represents the indi-
vidual. For example, the United States has treaties with some
nations with reprehensible criminal procedures. In a 1984 House
of Representatives report, Congressman Robert W. Kastenmeier
and fourteen other congressmen pointed to (the former) Yugosla-
via, Albania, Rumania, Bulgaria, Iraq, Turkey, Poland, and Haiti
as examples of such countries. They noted that bilateral treaties
existed with these countries prior to the ascendence of repressive
regimes, and argued that the changes in government may call
into question the abilities of these countries to assure the funda-
mental fairness of their legal systems." United States courts
must not turn a blind eye to the political realities of the extradi-
tion process.
'07 712 F Supp 383, 393 (S D NY 1986).
' 574 F Supp 854, 861 (S D NY 1983), aff'd, 767 F2d 908 (2d Cir 1985). See also
Hatzlachh Supply, Inc. v Savannah Bank of Nigeria, 649 F Supp 688, 692 (S D NY 1986)
(The court acknowledged the plaintiff's argument that the alternative forum was inade-
quate in part "due to purported corruption.").
1 In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F Supp 842, 847-53 (S D NY
1986), aff'd, 809 F2d 195 (2d Cir 1987).
1 809 F2d at 204-05.
.. 78 FRD 445, 455 (D Del 1978).
"' HR Rep No 998 at 62 (cited in note 71).
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A determination that a foreign state does not adequately
protect the rights of its citizens does not purport to condemn that
state per se. Rather, the court merely has determined that the
state should not be treated as a valid agent for the individual
before the court. Liberal analysis recognizes a continuing and
important role for states in the international system, but predi-
cates recognition of that role by the judicial branch on minimum
protections of human rights. This position preserves the indepen-
dent role of the judiciary as a protector of individual rights in the
international as well as domestic sphere, without unduly involv-
ing United States courts in political diplomacy.
CONCLUSION
It is time to step away from a theory of international law
that regards the interests of states and individuals as necessarily
divergent and mutually exclusive. As the Rauscher decision indi-
cated over one hundred years ago, the doctrine of specialty pro-
tects the interests of an extradited individual as well as the in-
terests of the asylum state. Other principles limiting the reach of
extradition treaties-the political offense exception and other
deviations from the traditional noninquiry rule-also serve to
protect complicated mixtures of individual and sovereign inter-
ests. United States courts must respect the sovereign interests of
other states, but they must also recognize that sovereigns should
represent the interests of their people. When they fail to do that,
the United States must become the guarantor of the defendant's
right to due process and permit an extradited individual to raise
the doctrine of specialty even without the support of the asylum
state.
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